

File USID D 76.11/16

8 November 1973

AW
BC
~~Don~~
Don
(lost) Don

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
ATTENTION : USIB Assistant
SUBJECT : CIA Comments on a Proposed Family of
National Intelligence Products

1. The production strategy outlined in this proposal has one valuable central idea, one central weakness, and a number of subsidiary points of varying merit.
2. The *valuable central idea* is that the community should be equipped to produce more of its intelligence in a national form. The proposal occasionally pushes this idea too far; given the uneven capabilities throughout the community on such topics as economics and non-military science, coordination would be more trouble than it was worth. Nevertheless, it is a valid criticism to assert that the consumer receives too much unilateral and overlapping material, particularly in crisis situations.
3. The *central weakness* is the proposal's silence on direction. Who initiates a National Watch Officers Bulletin? Who exercises quality control? Who is empowered to reject proposals on matters of lower priority to keep from flooding the system? The same questions apply with equal force to the National Analysts Summary, the National Intelligence Bulletin, and the National Intelligence Weekly.
4. If we discard the assumption that all these systems will operate spontaneously, there seems only one answer: control would have to be vested in the representatives of the DCI, to whom the President has made it plain that he looks for coordinated production. It seems a dubious tactic to leave it out of the proposal in hopes that the other agencies won't notice.

SECRET

25X1

5. Moreover, while this proposal pays lip service to the other publications of CIA and the community, the spirit is clearly to sweep them from the board and start virtually from the ground up. There may be virtues in this kind of shock treatment; if we consider, however, the number of other changes being introduced into the community, it would seem far better to use existing mechanics, modifying them wherever possible rather than junking them. The idea that both a new family of products and the old family can be simultaneously supported by our analytical assets while a kind of competition goes on is not workable, either from the producers' or the customers' viewpoint.

Some Specific Issues

6. *NOIWON and the NWOB.* It would be a mistake to include the White House Situation Room in NOIWON. The White House is a consumer and should not be flooded with raw intelligence in a crisis. What is needed are two products, a Draft National Watch Officers Bulletin and a NWOB. The DNWOB could be initiated by any member of NOIWON and would constitute a report plus a request for confirmation or additional information. After responses have circulated within the system, CIA--for an NIOC under the DCI--should coordinate and send to the WHSR an NWOB, or reject the DNWOB on grounds of error or triviality.

7. The suggestion (p. 14) that NIOWON/NOIAN would provide for an input of operational information poses serious problems. It is not reasonable to expect that the results of high-level and necessarily delicate negotiations would be fed into such a system, nor is it likely that JCS military operational plans could be revealed for discussion among intelligence analysts. Not only are there security problems, but we would run the risk that our use of this information would be perceived as a possible attempt to influence or formulate policy. This could be dangerous to the integrity of the community itself.

8. *NOIAN and the NAS.* This is the least clear part of the proposal, as exemplified in the mystifying statement on page 18 that "other events" would have

-2-

SECRET

generated 39 Summaries in March 1973. What does seem clear, however, is that the consumers, in crisis periods, need more frequent and timely coordinated summaries and analysis than those provided by a scheduled daily. This would seem to call for coordinated sitreps, which in theory could be produced in the proposed National Intelligence Operations Center. In practice, however, we have found that coordinating sitreps under pressure is not possible, even within our own house, if it involves getting the "chop" from the various chiefs. It is possible in practice to solicit and accept contributions from outside the immediate group producing the sitrep, and making use of "all the talents" in this way is not only feasible but highly desirable. But the community cannot afford to subordinate the timely production of information and spot analysis on "how the crisis is going" to coordination considerations.

9. *The Relationship between NWOB and IAS.* The proposal is too schematic in the sharp distinction drawn between factual reporting and analysis in time of crisis, and in its aversion to any scheduled production. Our experience in a host of crises, including the 1973 Middle Eastern war, is that consumers do not want a stream of separate items throughout the day and night. They find the Situation Report format highly convenient as a means of pulling together developments and adding analysis. This should not--indeed, does not--prohibit the immediate reporting, out of schedule, of truly key new items. But three or four sitreps a day, as opposed to an irregular stream of small items--some factual, some analytic--fits their consumption habits much better.

10. *The National Intelligence Daily.* This is a good idea, and we propose its immediate adoption, independently of the other proposals. We are prepared to drop or modify the Central Intelligence Bulletin, to accept drafts originated by other agencies, to encourage more active participation in coordination, and to welcome statements of dissent. We would expect the principles of CIA Chairmanship (paragraphs 2 and 3) to apply.

11. *The National Intelligence Weekly.* Here is another good idea. In defining it more specifically, we suggest that it focus on matters of clear significance to US interests

SECRET

which may require policy actions within several weeks, rather than on the more eclectic approach of the Current Intelligence Weekly Review. It can be thought of as an expansion of the Watch Report that would look a bit further forward and cover political and economic as well as military problems which, if they occur, could be expected to require a US response at a high level. It could readily be produced using a modified Watch Committee/NIC structure.

12. *The NIEs, SNIEs, NIAMs, and NSSMs.* The proposal does not seem to call for any change in these products, although the NIAM examples in paragraph 33 (page 26) raise questions about the authors' conception of how these products differ. It is problematical whether NSSM inputs, as distinct from formal "responses," could fit into the categories as suggested.

13. *The Role of the NIOs.* This matter is presently under debate, experimentation, and evolution, and the proposal acknowledges that its concepts on this matter may be premature. All that need be said at this point is that many of the references to the NIO's directing, initiating, and drafting role seem at variance with the DCI's emphasis on the staff nature of their function.

Odds and Ends

14. In the list of national consumers, a distinction needs to be made between those consumers who require a continuing flow of national intelligence on the whole spectrum of national security concerns and those with narrower, less continuous, but nonetheless equally real and important requirements. The economic policy people normally will be in this latter group. They will need special service, and special provision needs to be made for them, such as the Economic Intelligence Weekly. Moreover, a number of "national" customers will remain, under any scheme, a demand market for "departmental" papers.

15. It seems odd to assert that there are no established mechanisms or SOPs for producing national intelligence in times of crisis. How is it then that SNIEs get written? The mechanism is that the DCI initiates them, on his own motion or at the request of a consumer or USIB member (and presumably, in the future, at the suggestion of the NIO). The mechanism has worked poorly, but it does exist.

SECRET

SECRET

Conclusion

16. The proposal's concern to improve national intelligence is valid. Central direction is essential in this process and should be explicitly vested in the DCI and his representatives. Each of the national intelligence products proposed, as well as the NOIWAN conferencing procedure, should be reconsidered in this light. Overall, we should in any event move with some deliberation from the products we have toward what we propose to have; we cannot produce both at once, and we should test carefully to see whether new mechanics and structure will in fact bear the weight we would put on them.

-5-

SECRET